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INCIDENTAL THREAT DURING VISUOSPATIAL
WORKING MEMORY IN ADOLESCENT ANXIETY:
AN EMOTIONAL MEMORY-GUIDED SACCADE TASK
Sven C. Mueller, Ph.D.,1,2 Tomer Shechner, Ph.D.,3 Dana Rosen, B.A.,2 Eric E. Nelson, Ph.D.,2
Daniel S. Pine, M.D.,2 and Monique Ernst, M.D., Ph.D.2∗
Background:Pediatric anxiety disorders are among themost common psychiatric
mental illnesses in children and adolescents, and are associated with abnormal
cognitive control in emotional, particularly threat, contexts. In a series of studies
using eye movement saccade tasks, we reported anxiety-related alterations in the
interplay of inhibitory control with incentives, or with emotional distractors. The
present study extends these findings to working memory (WM), and queries the
interaction of spatial WM with emotional stimuli in pediatric clinical anxiety.
Methods: Participants were 33 children/adolescents diagnosed with an anxiety
disorder, and 22 age-matched healthy comparison youths. Participants completed
a novel eye movement task, an affective variant of the memory-guided saccade
task. This task assessed the influence of incidental threat on spatial WM pro-
cesses during high and low cognitive load. Results: Healthy but not anxious
children/adolescents showed slowed saccade latencies during incidental threat in
low-load but not high-load WM conditions. No other group effects emerged on
saccade latency or accuracy. Conclusions: The current data suggest a differ-
ential pattern of how emotion interacts with cognitive control in healthy youth
relative to anxious youth. These findings extend data from inhibitory processes,
reported previously, to spatial WM in pediatric anxiety. Depression and Anxiety
32:289–295, 2015. C© 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
Key words: cognitive load; development; children/adolescents; emotion; saccade;
eye movement; cognitive resources
1Department of Experimental Clinical and Health Psychology,
Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium
2Section on Developmental and Affective Neuroscience
(SDAN), National Institute of Mental Health, NIH, Bethesda,
Maryland
3Department of Psychology, University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel
∗Correspondence to: Monique Ernst, Section on Developmental
and Affective Neuroscience (SDAN), National Institute of Men-
tal Health/NIH, 15K North Drive, Bethesda, MD 20892. E-mail:
ernstm@mail.nih.gov.
Received for publication 19 July 2014; Revised 9 November 2014;
Accepted 16 December 2014
DOI 10.1002/da.22350
Published online 26 February 2015 in Wiley Online Library
(wileyonlinelibrary.com).
INTRODUCTION
Anxiety disorders in youths are highly prevalent (lifetime
prevalence of 28%),[1] interfere with academic and social
skill learning, and predict adverse outcomes extending
into adulthood.[2–4] Despite these deleterious effects and
the critical role of pediatric anxiety in the prevalence of
anxiety and mood disorders in adulthood, neurocogni-
tive research in pediatric anxiety is lagging behind re-
search in adult anxiety.
A decade ago, we initiated a series of studies aimed
at understanding the inﬂuence of anxiety on inhibitory
control in pediatric patients, in various conditions of
emotional contexts.[5–7] After identifying anxiety-related
deﬁcits in the interaction of inhibitory control with in-
centives, and then with threat stimuli,[5–7] we extended
this work to another form of cognitive control, working
memory (WM), using the same saccade eye movement
platform. One reason for this shift was based on the
C© 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
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notion that different cognitive control processes (e.g.,
set-shifting, inhibition, WM) develop at different rates.
Speciﬁcally, while inhibition already appears to be de-
veloped around 14 years of age, WM is not fully mature
until age 19,[8] suggesting that WM might be particu-
larly sensitive to emotional disruption relative to earlier
maturing executive functions.
The interplay of cognitive control with emotional
stimuli in anxiety has been the object of substantial work
in adults, but has to date received relatively little at-
tention in children and adolescents (for review see[9]).
Speciﬁcally, this adult work, together with research on
cognitive control, has generated a number of cognitive
theories applicable to the inﬂuence of anxiety on cogni-
tive performance, in a way that is particularly relevant to
WM.[10–13] These theories are based on two fundamen-
tal premises. First, anxiety is characterized by a cognitive
component supporting the cardinal symptom of worry,
which uses WM. Second, cognitive functioning oper-
ates in the context of limited resources that necessitates
a prioritization of processes. These theories vary in the
way resources are distributed across cognitive and af-
fective information processing. The most parsimonious
model predicts that anxiety reduces the cognitive re-
source pool that in turn affects the distribution of re-
sources, particularly when WM tasks compete with the
processing of emotional stimuli. The key question rests
on how cognitive resources are redistributed, and hence
which processes suffer from this redistribution.Here, we
based our predictions on a recent work dedicated to this
question.[13]
In this previous work, Vytal et al. examined in healthy
adults the effects of threat induced anxiety on WM at
various levels of difﬁculty.[13] Findings revealed disrup-
tive effects of induced anxiety at low-difﬁculty cognitive
level (one-backWM), but not at high-difﬁculty cognitive
level (three-backWM). This result was consistent with a
redistribution of resources that permitted, at low level of
cognitive difﬁculty, to process both the threat stimuli and
the cognitive task. The processing of the threat stimuli
during the low-load WM task led to the coding of anxi-
ety, which, in turn, interferedwith task performance.On
the other hand, the high-load (three-backWM) taskmo-
bilized all available resources, preventing the threat stim-
uli from being processed, and therefore from interfering
with the high-load WM performance. Taken together,
these ﬁndings suggested that, in healthy adults, process-
ing threat impairedWMat low load. Testing these affec-
tive/cognitive interactions in anxious individuals might
reveal deviant mechanisms pointing to potential targets
of therapeutic intervention.
The present study differed in three ways from Vytal
et al.’s. First, we tested adolescents rather than adults;
second, we used an external threat stimulus (fearful face
stimuli) rather than endogenous threat stimuli (worry
thoughts, associated with threat of shock); and third,
we employed saccade eye movements rather than man-
ual responses. Some of these differences could affect the
strength of the interference effects. Speciﬁcally, inter-
ference effects might be stronger in adolescents versus
adults, but weaker with an external versus internal
threat distractor. The reasons for the former are
the ongoing maturation of cognitive processes (e.g.,
[8]), together with an ampliﬁed emotional responsivity
during adolescence (e.g.,[14,15]), resulting in weaker cog-
nitive control and stronger emotional inﬂuence, respec-
tively. Regarding the threat stimuli, the internal threat
stimuli (worry thoughts) might interact directly with
WM processes because they themselves consume WM
resources (e.g.,[16]), whereas the external threat stim-
uli might just divert attention or/and use cognitive re-
sources to be processed, which would compete with
WM capacity.[11] Finally, saccadic eye movement re-
sponses provide exquisite measures of attention and per-
formance, which have also been shown to be sensitive to
pediatric psychopathology (e.g.,[17]), and thus might en-
hance our power to detect inﬂuences on performance.
Collectively, these task differences between the previous
work and the current study were not expected to modify
the basic normative results, as described above.
In sum, this study compared healthy adolescents with
clinically anxious adolescents on a low load versus high
load WM task (cognitive process) using an emotional
(threat-related) versus neutral distractor background
(emotional process). We expected to ﬁnd, similarly to
Vytal et al.’s study,[13] impaired performance on the low-
load WM task in the presence of the threat stimuli in
healthy participants. In contrast, the presence of the
threat stimuli in patients with an anxiety disorder would
be expected to take priority over task performance given
the salience of threat in anxiety. Accordingly, we would
then expect alteration of performance on both low- and
high-load WM tasks based on prioritization of threat
processing. In addition, given that worry consumesWM
resources, we might anticipate anxious patients to per-
form worse on WM than healthy comparisons based on
reduced WM capacity, although WM in general is not




Twenty-two typically developing healthy adolescents (13 females,
mean age 13.42 years SD 2.15 years) were compared to 33 clinically
anxious adolescents (18 females, mean age 12.44 years SD 2.92 years).
The study was approved by the National Institute of Mental Health
Institutional Review Board. Participants were recruited through local
newspaper advertisements and word of mouth. The parents of all par-
ticipants provided written informed consent, whereas the adolescents
signed written assent.
Inclusion criteria for anxious adolescents included (1) primary di-
agnosis of an anxiety disorder based on a semistructured diagnostic
interview by experienced clinicians, and demonstrated excellent in-
terrater reliability for each diagnosis (k > 0.75; schedule for affective
disorders and schizophrenia for school-age children—present and life-
time version (KSAD-PL);[19] (2) Children’s Global Assessment Scale’s
score < 60 (CGAS);[20] (3) Pediatric Anxiety Rating Scale score >
9;[21] and (4) age between 8 and 18 years. All participants were
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TABLE 1. Demographics for the healthy and anxious
groups
Healthy Anxious
(n = 22) (n = 33) Signiﬁcance
Sex (n/female) 13 18 ns
Age 13.42 (2.15) 12.47 (2.96) ns
IQ total score 115.76 (13.51) 109.12 (14.29) ns
Vocabularya 60.30 (9.29) 55.88 (10.29) ns
Matrix reasoninga 58.60 (6.81) 55.84 (10.59) ns
SES 36.89 (14.66) 36.40 (16.01) ns
SCARED child 6.82 (5.49) 33.43 (11.11) P < .001
SCARED parent 2.86 (5.11) 30.75 (11.91) P < .001
CDI 40.23 (7.94) 52.72 (9.71) P < .001
Diagnosesb: N (%)
GAD - 20 (60.60)
SP - 21 (63.63)
SAD - 9 (27.27)
Panic - 1 (3.03)
MDD - 4 (12.12)
ADHD - 2 (6.06)
aT score.
SES, socioeconomic status; SCARED, Screen for Childhood Anxiety-
Related Emotional Disorders; CDI, Child Depression Inventory;
GAD, generalized anxiety disorder; SP, social phobia; SAD, separation
anxiety disorder; MDD, major depressive disorder; ADHD, attention
deﬁcit hyperactivity disorder.
bseveral co-morbid diagnoses were possible.
seeking outpatient treatment. Inclusion criteria for healthy adolescents
consisted of (1) absence of acute or chronic medical problems; (2) ab-
sence of current or past psychiatric mental illness; (3) age range 8–18
years. Exclusion criteria for all participants were (1) current use of any
psychoactive substance; (2) current Tourette’s syndrome, obsessive–
compulsive disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder, conduct disorder,
exposure to extreme trauma, or suicidal ideation; (3) lifetime history of
mania, psychosis, or pervasive developmental disorder; or (4) IQ < 70.
Individual anxiety and depression levels were assessed with the Screen
for Childhood Anxiety Related Emotional Disorders (SCARED),[22]
and the Child Depression Inventory (CDI),[23] respectively.
Overall, healthy adolescents did not differ signiﬁcantly from clini-
cally anxious children in age (t(53) = 1.31, P = .20), IQ (t(53) = 1.74,
P = .09), socioeconomic status (SES, t(46) = 0.11, P = .92), or sex dis-
tribution (x2(1) = 0.11, P = .74; Table 1). As expected, anxiety ratings
(SCARED) on self-reports (t(44.86)= 11.29,P <.001) and parental re-
ports (t(43.92)= 11.49, P <.001), as well as self-rated depression (CDI:
t(49) = 4.92, P <.001) were higher in the anxious than the compari-
son group. Of the anxious adolescents, 20 participants had generalized
anxiety disorder (GAD), 21 had social phobia, nine had separation
anxiety (SAD), one had panic disorder, and four suffered from comor-
bid depression, while two additional subjects had comorbid attention
deﬁcit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD; see Table 1). All participants
were medication-free and treatment-seeking for their anxiety disorder
at the time of testing.
SACCADIC WM TASK (SWMT)
In this study, we used saccadic eye movements to probe the in-
terplay of emotional and WM processes. We developed an emotional
variant of thememory-guided saccade task. In the standard version of this
task, participants are required to maintain ﬁxation to a central point,
whereas a target is ﬂashed brieﬂy in the periphery. After a variable
delay, the central ﬁxation extinguishes and the participant is required
to saccade to the correct location where the target appeared. This
task has been successfully used in pediatric patient populations (e.g.,
ADHD;[24] schizophrenia[25]). We modiﬁed the standard version in
two ways, ﬁrst by manipulating the emotional background, and sec-
ond by manipulating the memory load (Fig. 1).
Each trial started with a 500 ms white central ﬁxation cross (2 mm
× 2 mm) on a black background. The ﬁxation cross changed into a
white circle to indicate trial onset, and target stimuli were presented
in the periphery, for 1200 ms, whereas participants maintained central
ﬁxation. Target stimuli consisted of 7.2 mm × 6.2 mm colored squares
(cyan, brown, green, and magenta) in two (top left and bottom right
or top right and bottom left = low-load trial) or all four screen cor-
ners (high-load trial). The colored squares contained a face depicting
either a fearful or neutral expression. The peripheral stimuli then dis-
appeared, while participants continued to maintain ﬁxation on central
cross (jittered between 2000 and 3000 ms). Finally, the color of the
central circle changed from white into one of the target colors for 300
ms (imperative cue; Fig. 1). Participants were instructed to make their
eye movement into the quadrant previously occupied by the depicted
color and to maintain this ﬁxation until the onset of the next ﬁxation
cross that denoted the start of the next trial. To make the task more
motivating and encourage compliance, children were told this was a
game where they could hone their “spy skills.” They were told they
had to observe and memorize objects (in the present case colored rect-
angles) in the periphery without directly looking at them (just like spies
observe people without looking at them).
Emotional and neutral face stimuli consisted of 16 different ac-
tors (eight male, eight female) selected from the NIMSTIM dataset
(http://www.macbrain.org/resources.htm).[26] Each actor was pre-
sented twice, once bearing a neutral expression, and another time a
fearful expression. This generated four trial types: low- and high-load
trials of either fearful or neutral valence.
To ensure further that participants maintained central ﬁxation
during peripheral presentation of the target colors until the imperative
cue, 28 catch trials were included in the task. These trials were identi-
cal to the high- and low-load trials, but did not include the encoding
phase. During the catch trials, the white central circle was immediately
replaced with a colored cue for 300 ms, skipping the delay/encoding
phase of the other two trial types. During these randomly occurring
catch trials, gazing away from central ﬁxation resulted in inability to
perform the trial correctly and ﬁnding the correct quadrant. Thus,
catch trials encouraged participants to maintain central ﬁxation in
order to perform the task correctly. Given that participants could not
distinguish between catch trials and regular trials until the disappear-
ance of the peripheral faces, they were encouraged to maintain central
ﬁxation at all times during all trials. The amount of catch trials was
equally split between high-load (50%) and low-load (50%) trials.
The task consisted of 176 trials in total, comprising 74 high-load
trials (37 for each emotion), 74 low-load trials (37 for each emotion),
and 28 catch trials (14 high load/14 low load). All conditions were
randomly presented, and participants were trained on the task prior to
study participation. The training task included face stimuli that were
not used in the experimental task.
EYE MOVEMENT RECORDING
Eye movements were tracked and recorded with an ASL Model
504 (Applied Science Laboratories, Boston, MA) at 240 Hz tem-
poral resolution and 0.25° spatial resolution. Saccades were deﬁned
as movements greater than 30°/s that lasted at least 25 ms. To
determine correct and incorrect movements, only the ﬁrst saccade
following the onset of the central imperative cue was considered. Sac-
cade accuracy was indexed as the percent of saccades directed to the
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Figure 1. Typical trial. (A) Regular high-load (left half of panel A) and low-load (right half of panel A) trials. (B) Catch trials for high load
(left half of panel B) and low load (right half of panel B). The only difference between the trial types is the absence of an encoding phase
in the catch trials. Timings are otherwise identical. The white arrow only serves to indicate the correct direction where the response
should have been made to for the viewer, but this arrow did not appear in the task.
correct corner. Saccade latency for correct trials was the time between
the onset of the cue and the initiation of a saccade to one of the four tar-
get corners. To exclude anticipatory saccades or saccades in response
to a preceding trial, saccade latencies faster than 80 ms or slower than
2000 ms were excluded.
DATA ANALYSIS
To obtain a more robust measure of latencies and to account for
outliers and skewness in RT distribution, we used the mean of me-
dian RT for latency analyses (for each subject, a median for each con-
dition was calculated and submitted to the analyses across subjects;
the resulting means are reported, e.g.,[27]). Accuracy data were cal-
culated as percent error. Latency and accuracy data were separately
subjected to a 2 × 2 × 2 repeated measures analysis of covariance
(rANCOVA) with emotion (fear vs. neutral) and WM load (high vs.
low) as the within-subject variables and group (healthy adolescents
vs. anxious adolescents) as the between-subject variable. Despite ab-
sence of differences between groups on demographic variables, such
as age and IQ, these two variables were included as covariates of no
interest in the main analysis to factor out the variance associated with
these variables.[28] However, to further assess any potential impact of
IQ, correlations were performed between IQ (total score and the sub-
scores of matrix reasoning and vocabulary) and WM performance for
the low- and high-load trials, in each group separately. Finally, given
that catch trials were few in number and only served to ensure ﬁxation,
these trials were not analyzed. However, a basic manipulation check
revealed that healthy adolescents (21.31% ± SEM 4.04) and anxious
adolescents (20.72% ± SEM 3.26) did not differ in the amount of in-
correctly executed catch trials (F(1,53) = 0.01, P = .91) and were not
analyzed further. Importantly, given that only one of ﬁve catch tri-
als were executed incorrectly suggests that participants were aiming
to maintain central ﬁxation. Statistical signiﬁcance was deﬁned using
α = 0.05, two-tailed.
Figure 2. Latencies in milliseconds showing the significantly re-
duced latencies to neutral stimuli relative to fearful stimuli on
low-load trials in the comparison group. This effect is absent in
the anxious group. ∗P < .05.
RESULTS
LATENCIES
The critical three-way interaction between group,
emotion and load was signiﬁcant (F(1,51) = 6.02, p =
.02, η2 = .11; Fig. 2). The main effects of group (F(1,51)
= 0.41, P = .53), load (F(1,51) = .007, P = .93), or
emotion (F(1,51)<.01, P = .99) were not signiﬁcant.
To follow-up the signiﬁcant three-way interaction,
we conducted an emotion by load analysis of variance
Depression and Anxiety
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(ANOVA) in each group separately. In the healthy
group, the emotion by load interaction was signiﬁcant
(F(1,21) = 10.29, P = .004, η2 = .33). Post hoc paired
t-tests indicated that, in the low-load condition, the
latencies were signiﬁcantly slower for fearful than neu-
tral faces (t(21) = 2.19, P = .04). However, in the high-
load condition, latencies did not differ between fearful
and neutral faces (t(21) = 1.22, P = .24). In the anx-
ious youths, the emotion by load interaction was not
signiﬁcant (F(1,32) = 0.26, P = .62, η2 = .008). Finally,
the main effect of load was signiﬁcant in both groups
(healthy: F(1,21) = 57.91, P <.001, η2 = .73; anxious:
F(1,32) = 44.52, P <.001, η2 = .58). In summary, the
main group difference in the latencies was that healthy
but not anxious participants showed an interference
effect of threat during low but not high cognitive load
on saccade latency.
ACCURACY
ANOVA on accuracy rates (percent error) only re-
vealed a main effect of load (F(1,51) = 7.51, P = .008,
η2 = .13), indicating larger error rates during high (mean
= 31.00%, SD = 13.30%) relative to low (mean =
16.79%, SD = 11.74%) cognitive load. In addition, the
main effect of age was also signiﬁcant (F(1,51) = 9.33, P
<.01, η2 = .16), revealing an expected greater accuracy
with older age. No other effects were signiﬁcant.
ADDITIONAL ANALYSES OF DIAGNOSTIC
COMORBIDITY, INTELLIGENCE, AND SEVERITY
To account for a potential impact of comorbid de-
pression, we reran analyses after removing the four pa-
tients with comorbid major depressive disorder (MDD).
The three-way emotion by load by group interaction in
the latencies remained signiﬁcant (F(1,49) = 8.83, P =
.005), suggesting no impact of comorbid depression. In
addition, to assess measures of severity, scores from the
SCARED child were correlated with WM performance
(latencies and errors) for the low- and high-load trials.
This analysis did not yield any signiﬁcant effects, neither
when the groups were combined (all r < .27, all P > .06)
or analyzed separately (all r < .20, all P > .30). Finally,
we also examined the issue of IQ for each group sepa-
rately, but none of the correlations between the IQ total
score or the IQ subscores (matrix reasoning, vocabulary)
and performance to high- or low-load trials reached sta-
tistical signiﬁcance (all r < .32, all P > .17).
DISCUSSION
This study examined the interplay of cognitive and
emotional processes in healthy and anxiety disordered
adolescents. Our ultimate goal was to shed light on the
potential mechanisms underlying the deleterious conse-
quences of clinical anxiety on emotional interferences
with cognitive performance, so critical to the pediatric
period.
From the perspective of limited resources
theories,[29,30] we expected that healthy adoles-
cents would exhibit cognitive interference by emotional
stimuli only at low-load WM, but that anxious ado-
lescents would show such interference at both low-
and high-load WM. Findings conﬁrmed predictions
for healthy adolescents (longer latencies to fearful vs.
neutral trials), but not for anxious adolescents. Anxious
adolescents showed no inﬂuence of the emotional
manipulation on cognitive performance at either low or
high load. In addition, overall, WM performance (RT
and accuracy) did not differ between the anxiety and the
comparison groups, at either low- or high-load WM.
Results in the healthy group support previous
ﬁndings[13] that cohere with the limited resources the-
ories (e.g.,[29,30]). Speciﬁcally, threat-related distractors
impaired WM performance, but only when cognitive
resources were left available to process the threat stimuli.
These data suggest that high-load cognitive processes
might minimize the impact of threat-related stimuli.
However, contrary to expectations, this pattern was not
evident, let alone ampliﬁed, in the clinically anxious
group. Thus, the critical question is why incidental
threat failed to affect WM performance in anxious
patients. We propose two possible interpretations.
The ﬁrst one relies on the overall effect of chronic
worry onWM capacity. Speciﬁcally, worry would hijack
WM resources such that remaining resources would be
just large enough to process the task at hand. In this
case, incidental threat stimuli would not be processed,
even at low-load WM, and, in turn, would not interfere
with performance. Unfortunately, measures of amount
of worry were not collected during the study. However,
given that these anxious adolescents carried a diagnosis
of anxiety, severe enough to lead them to seek treat-
ment, might imply that worry was chronically present in
this sample. This interpretation also would imply that
the processing of threat stimuli was not prioritized over
cognitive processing in this experiment. This order of
priority might be reasonable given the mild degree of
threat that our incidental stimuli carry. Stronger induced
emotions could tip this balance, leading to an engage-
ment of resources that prioritizes emotion over cognitive
(WM) processes in anxious adolescents. However, since
stronger and more intense emotional pictures may not
be ethically age-appropriate, another alternative would
be to evoke sensory responses to aversive noise that have
also been used in youths.[31]
The second possible interpretation relies on the threat
bias for ambiguous stimuli, which has been described
in anxiety. Speciﬁcally, anxious participants tend to
perceive neutral faces as ambiguous or negative.[32] It is
currently unclear as to whether anxious children gener-
alized the fearful attribute of fearful faces to neutral faces
across both load conditions, or whether they simply
blocked out the emotional valence and ignored the faces
altogether. However, supporting the ﬁrst notion, gen-
eralization of perceptually similar stimuli, such as faces,
is consistent with some accounts of fear learning.[33]
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Moreover, the idea that the anxious adolescents might
have processed the neutral faces as threat stimuli,
similarly to the fearful faces, is consistent with the trend
that latencies to neutral faces seemed comparatively
slower in the anxious group than in the comparison
group (see Fig. 2). The inclusion of happy faces or
stronger emotional stimuli, as alluded to above, would
have been helpful to examine this argument further.
The absence of overall differences in WM perfor-
mance between the anxious and comparison adolescents
is interesting. This highlights the complexity of the re-
lationship between anxiety and WM, which depends on
multiple factors, including the level of cognitive engage-
ment and difﬁculty, the intensity of threat stimuli, the
state of worry of the individuals, and the motivation to
do well (particularly intense in anxious individuals). The
present work provides some preliminary evidence that
the interactions between threat stimuli and task difﬁculty
differ between anxious patients and healthy individuals
in adolescents. The present ﬁndings should be followed
by experiments thatmanipulatewider ranges of cognitive
difﬁculty and incidental threat intensity, while recording
levels of worry and motivation in the participants.
Finally, our ﬁndings are consistent with body of work
that has used the sensitivity of eye movement tasks to
examine pathology-related deﬁcits in inhibitory control
andWM in children and adolescents (e.g.,[17,24,25,34]). A
novel extension of the current study was the addition of
two levels of cognitive load and an affective dimension
to the classic saccadic WM task. Although the current
ﬁndings support the utility of using emotional variants
of the saccadic WM task to accurately assess the im-
pact of emotion on spatial WM processes, some caution
is warranted. A modulation of WM was found in the
healthy but not in the anxious patients, who, in addi-
tion, failed to show any modulation of the latency ﬁnd-
ings with measures of IQ or anxiety severity. Therefore,
more work is required to further link anxious symptoms
to WM deﬁcits. Yet, future work can build on these
ﬁndings as suggested above (e.g., by including happy
faces).
Some limitations should be addressed. First, the rela-
tively small sample size limits generalization. However,
although the sample of healthy controls was somewhat
smaller than the patient group, a modulating effect of
emotion was found in the former group, suggesting that
the lack of ﬁnding in the patients was unlikely to be due
to insufﬁcient statistical power. A second limitation con-
cerns the heterogeneity of the anxious sample in terms
of diagnoses of anxiety disorders. Although such hetero-
geneity can reduce the statistical power to detect differ-
ences, it is representative of the phenotypical proﬁle of
pediatric anxiety disorders.[35] In addition, we did not
expect that the fundamental mechanism associated with
limited resources would be disorder speciﬁc, a presump-
tion that would need to be tested. Third, given that
our stimuli were taken from an established dataset of
faces[26], we did not collect stimulus ratings that could
have been helpful in assessing the level of threat gen-
eralization across fearful and neutral faces. Fourth, and
ﬁnally, followingpreviouswork,[36] wepseudo-randomly
interspersed catch trials to motivate participants and
encourage task compliance. Although it appeared that
participants did indeed follow instruction given the rel-
atively low error rates on these trials, to fully assess their
effect, one would have to rerun the task using blocks with
and blocks without catch trials to estimate their impact.
In summary, this is the ﬁrst study to demonstrate dif-
ferences in WM performance during incidental threat
between anxious and comparison adolescents using a
memory-guided saccade task. In particular, while threat
differentially impacted response latencies in healthy
youths, no such effect was seen in the anxious group.
These ﬁndings in adolescents are important to better
understand how clinical anxiety can impact cognitive
control processes in adolescents, and, reciprocally, how
cognitive activity can modulate anxiety.
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